Attorney's Fees for § 1983 Claims in Fair
Hearings: Rethinking Current
Jurisprudence
Erika Geettert
Section 1983 provides a cause of action to an individual injured by any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives
her "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 1 The 1976 Attorney's Fees Awards Act ("§
1988") provides that a court may award an individual who prevails
in any action or proceeding to enforce § 1983 "a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."2 The language of these two statutes
leads one to conclude that all individuals who prove that state officials have violated their federal rights are equally eligible to receive attorney's fees under § 1988. This conclusion, however, is
incorrect.
Consider the following situation: A woman residing in New
York City receives notice that the local social service agency is terminating her benefits under Aid to Families with Dependent Chilt B.A. 1985, Yale University; J.D. Candidate 1989, The University of Chicago.
1

42 USC § 1983 (1982) provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of
the District of Columbia.
2 42 USC § 1988 (1982) provides in relevant part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985,
and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], or title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs.
Though the Act appears to apply equally to plaintiffs and defendants, the Senate, following
case law interpreting the fee shifting provisions of Title VII, intended that a successful
plaintiff receive fees as a matter of course, but that a defendant receive fees only when the
plaintiff's suit is "clearly frivolous, vexatious, or brought for harassment purposes." The
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, S Rep No 94-1011, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 5
(1976) ("Senate Report") reprinted in 1976 USCCAN 5908, 5912.
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dren ("AFDC").3 The notice informs her that she is entitled to a
fair hearing to contest the termination and to representation at
such a hearing. The woman, feeling that she cannot adequately
represent herself at a hearing, seeks an attorney who might be willing to help.
The attorney with whom she speaks researches her case and
decides that the agency has violated the federal Social Security
Act. The attorney tells the woman that under current law she has
two options. First, she can bring an action in federal district court
or state court under 42 USC § 1983, claiming that the agency's
action deprived her of a right secured by the laws of the United
States. If she wins she will almost certainly get attorney's fees
under § 1988. Second, she can make the same claim in an optional
administrative fair hearing to be conducted by a state hearing examiner. If she wins, however, she will not get attorney's fees. The
attorney tells the woman that, given the speed of the hearing and
its simplified procedures, the second option would probably be in
her best interest, and that she has a very strong case, but that he
cannot represent her unless assured of fees.
The foregoing dilemma arises because the Supreme Court has
read § 1988 to bar fees for parties who prevail in optional administrative proceedings. Though the Court has not ruled directly on
the applicability of § 1988 to § 1983 claims raised in administrative
fair hearings, a reading of the Supreme Court's decisions on attorney's fees for other types of optional administrative proceedings
strongly suggests that it would rule against such an award. The
Court has distinguished between mandatory administrative proceedings under Title VII and optional administrative proceedings
under the statutes covered by § 1988, allowing fees in the former,
but disallowing fees in the latter. In addition, the Court, on procedural grounds, has refused to allow plaintiffs who prevail in optional administrative proceedings to bring a separate action for
fees. This creates yet another barrier to fee recovery.
Using the proceedings developed by New York State as an example, this comment examines the question of whether state administrative proceedings to enforce welfare benefits extended
under federal law should be considered "proceedings to enforce §
1983" and hence lead to an award of attorney's fees under § 1988.
Though the comment focuses on proceedings to enforce AFDC
benefits, the arguments it advances also apply to other federal3 Aid to Families with Dependent Children, The Social Security Act of 1935, Title IVA, 42 USC § 601 et seq (1982).
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state programs that require states to hold hearings in conjunction
with the distribution of funds.'
This comment argues that in the case of federally mandated
fair hearings, the Supreme Court should rethink its jurisprudence
barring fees for optional administrative proceedings. Alternatively,
Congress should remedy the Supreme Court's jurisprudence by
amending those statutes that require fair hearings to make it clear
that fees are available under § 1988 to parties who prevail on §
1983 claims in such hearings. Section I of the comment first demonstrates that, in certain cases, fair hearings conducted under
grant-in-aid programs such as AFDC constitute "proceedings to
enforce § 1983" and fall within the language of § 1988. It then sets
forth the mechanics of fee recovery for successful fair hearing participants. Section II of the comment examines the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence regarding the award of attorney's fees for
administrative proceedings, specifically discussing the way in
which the Court has differentiated between administrative proceedings under Title VII and those under the statutes covered by §
1988 such as § 1983. Sections III and IV argue that this differentiation is unwarranted and that, although AFDC fair hearings are optional, individuals who choose fair hearings over court actions
should still be entitled to fee awards under § 1988.

I. A

FRAMEWORK FOR FEE AWARDS IN

AFDC

FAIR HEARINGS

In Maine v Thiboutot,5 the Supreme Court upheld a welfare
recipient's right to bring suit against the state under § 1983 claiming that the state's decision to change the way it computed AFDC
benefits violated the Social Security Act. The Court found that the
words "and laws" in the language of § 1983 meant "that the § 1983
remedy broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory as well
as constitutional law." 6 Though subsequent cases limit the extent
to which § 1983 provides private plaintiffs a cause of action to enforce federal statutes,7 they do not cast doubt op the existence of a
'

For instance, the analysis would apply to benefits extended under Medicaid, 42 USC

§ 1396 et seq (1982), or the Food Stamps Act of 1977, 7 USC § 2011 et seq (1982).
5 448 US 1 (1980).
" Id at 4.
1 The broad language of Thiboutot, sanctioning private causes of action under § 1983
for public rights, was modified one year later in Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v Halderman, 451 US 1 (1981) (if a statute merely requires a state to provide assurance to a federal agency that it is complying with that statute, but does not confer substantive rights on
individuals, then there is no cause of action under § 1983 to enforce the statute), and Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v National Sea Clammers Association, 453 US 1 (1981)
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private right of action under § 1983 for beneficiaries of funds
under the Social Security Act.8
Plaintiffs who prevail in "actions or proceedings to enforce §
1983" are entitled to receive attorney's fees under 42 USC § 1988. 9
The Thiboutot Court made clear that those who prevail in § 1983
suits brought to enforce federal statutes such as the Social Security
Act are entitled to fees just as those who prevail on constitutional
claims. 10 Though Thiboutot settled the question of the use of §
1983 and § 1988 in court cases to enforce the Social Security Act, it
did not answer the question of whether adjudicatory proceedings
conducted by state agencies administering grant programs under
the Social Security Act constitute "proceedings to enforce § 1983"
within the meaning of § 1988. AFDC, the federal statute at issue in
Thiboutot, provides a good test case for answering this question,
and New York State's fair hearings exemplify the type of administrative proceedings that states conduct under AFDC.
A. The AFDC Program
AFDC, a grant program established by the Social Security Act
of 1935, enables states to aid needy children who have been deprived of parental support either because their fathers are unemployed or absent from home continuously, or their mothers are ab(no cause of action under § 1983 for alleged violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act and Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act because statutes in question had
comprehensive enforcement mechanisms). For a discussion of the effect of these two cases
on Thiboutot, see Note, Making the Old Federalism Work: Section 1983 and the Rights of
Grant-in-Aid Beneficiaries, 92 Yale L J 1001 (1983); Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and
the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U Chi L Rev 394 (1982).
" The availability of a § 1983 action against states or state officials acting in their official capacity is limited by state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to suits
in federal court. In Edelman v Jordan, 415 US 651 (1974), the Supreme Court held that
neither § 1983 nor participation in a federally funded program acts as a waiver of state
sovereign immunity. Therefore, an order requiring state officials to pay retroactive benefits
to persons denied such benefits under invalid state regulations was found to violate the
Eleventh Amendment. After"Edelman, suits against state officials may be brought in federal
court only for prospective injunctive relief. Otherwise they must be brought in state court.
9 Though the language of § 1988 does not actually "entitle" a plaintiff to fees, the discretion that it gives the court is, in practice, extremely narrow. Congress has mandated that
a prevailing party "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances
would render such an award unjust." Senate Report at 4, reprinted in 1976 USCCAN at
5912 (cited in note 2) (quoting Newman v Piggie Park Enterprises,390 US 400, 402 (1968)).
Allegations by defendants that special circumstances exist "are almost unanimously rejected
by the courts." Robert W. Fioretti & James J. Convery, Attorney's Fees: The Mushrooming
Cloud of Litigation, 34 De Paul L Rev 943, 946 n 21 (1985).
10 448 US at 9-10.
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sent, incapacitated, or deceased.11 In New York State, the federal
government finances 50 percent of the program.12 The laws and
regulations that govern the program are part federal and part state
and local. The state defines the level of need for purposes of determining eligibility for the program, sets its own benefit levels, establishes certain income and resource limits, and administers the program. " However, the state must do all of this within limitations
set by the federal government, many of which are quite specific.
Among other requirements, there are federal guidelines for the
maximum gross income of beneficiaries 14 and limitations on countable income, 15 as well as requirements for beneficiary participation
in wort%incentive programs. 6 By accepting the federal grant under
AFDC, New York State has agreed to comply with all federal regulations governing the program.1
The federal government also dictates the hearing procedure
that the state must provide individuals who have been denied assistance or have had aid terminated or reduced. 8 Under federal
regulations, these procedures, known as "fair hearings," must be
before a state agency, though they may be preceded by an evidentiary hearing at the local level.' 9
In New York, the state Department of Social Services administers AFDC through local social services districts organized on
the county level.2 0 Public assistance applicants or recipients have
1 House Committee on Ways and Means, Background Materialand Data on Programs
within the Jurisdictionof the Committee on Ways and Means, 99th Cong, 2d Sess 354
(1986).
Id at 383.

42 USCA § 602(a)(7)(1988).
1 42 USCA § 602(a)(18)(1988).
42 USCA § 602(a)(8)(A)(1988).
42 USCA § 602(a)(19)(1988).
' The Social Security Act creates a "federally imposed obligation [on the States] to
furnish 'aid to families with dependent children... with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.'" King v Smith, 392 US 309, 333 (1968) (quoting the Social Security Act).
See also, Torres v Perales, 121 App Div 2d 386, 388, 503 NYS2d 96 (1986) ("Federal law
requires a state which adopts the AFDC program to provide benefits to all eligible persons.
. and such a state may not limit eligibility to or impose restrictions on AFDC benefits in
any manner which does not comport with Federal law").
"s These procedures, set out in the regulations promulgated by Health and Human Services' Office of Family Assistance pursuant to 42 USCA § 602(a)(4) (1988), impose both
constitutional and statutory requirements on fair hearings. They state that hearings must
"meet the due process standards set forth in the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)" and detail the situations in which a hearing must be granted
as well as the rules governing the hearing itself, such as the claimant's right to examine
contents of the case file or bring witnesses. 45 CFR 205.10(a)(1-5) (1987).
1945 CFR 205.10(a)(1) (1987).
20 NY Social Services Law, Art II, §§ 17, 20, 34 (McKinney 1983). New York divides up
"
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the right to contest local social service officials' decisions on
whether to grant, discontinue, or reduce assistance. These challenges take place in a fair hearing before the state commissioner. 21
The federal regulations do not limit the type of claims that a
state may entertain in fair hearings. The federal Department of
Health and Human Services ("HHS"), which administers the program, clearly contemplated that at times claimants would seek
hearings not only to demand their entitlement to benefits under a
valid state law, but also to contest the validity of the state's policies, laws, or regulations under federal law.2 2 New York State's regulations permit fair hearings upon denial or discontinuation of
grants and upon "any other grounds affecting the applicant or recipient's entitlement to assistance or the amount thereof or the
time of payment thereof ....,23
B. Fee Generating Claims in Fair Hearings
Only those claims advanced in fair hearings that can be characterized as claims to enforce § 1983 would give rise to fees under §
1988. Hence, certain claims will not generate fees.24 For instance,
claims involving pure issues of fact under the applicable state law
or regulation are not § 1983 actions and will not give rise to fees.2 5
grant administration among 57 counties and New York City. Characteristicsof State Plans
for Aid to Families with Dependent Children under the Social Security Act, Title IV-A
201, 205 (HHS, 1986).
21 18 NYCRR § 358.2(f)(1983). Section 1983 actions cannot be raised against officials
who administer programs that are wholly federally funded, for such officials do not act
"under color of state law." Ellis v Blum, 643 F2d 68, 83 (2d Cir 1981). However, the Second
Circuit has held that officials who administer programs whose costs are shared by state and
federal governments act "under color of state law." Rose v Heintz, 806 F2d 389 (2d Cir
1986). If plaintiffs prevail in such actions they are entitled to fees under § 1988. Id at 391.
22 The regulations stipulate that, at the discretion of the state, a hearing may be denied
"when either State or Federal law requires automatic grant adjustments for classes of recipients unless the reason for an individual appeal is incorrect grant computation." 45 CFR
205.10(a)(5)(1987). If a state does decide to hold a hearing when "the sole issue is one of
State or Federal law or policy, or change in State or Federal law" then the regulations provide that the agency may discontinue benefits before a fair hearing decision is rendered. 45
CFR 205.10(a)(6)(1987).
23 18 NYCRR § 358.4(a)(6)(1986).
24 For a suggestion of the way to categorize the type of issues that might be brought up
in a fair hearing, see Laura Cooper, Goldberg's ForgottenFootnote:Is There a Due Process
Right to a Hearing Prior to the Termination of Welfare Benefits When the Only Issue
Raised Is a Question of Law?, 64 Minn L Rev 1107 (1980). In a study of Minnesota fair
hearings, Cooper shows that issues of law (including interpretation, conflict between state
and federal law, and unconstitutionality) arise in a substantial number of fair hearings.
25 An example of an issue of fact is whether a recipient is "unemployable by virtue of a
'medically determined physical or mental impairment."' Collins v D'Elia, 104 App Div
1035, 480 NYS2d 948 (1984).
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Neither will claims that a local official's policy conflicts with a substantive provision of state law or state regulations, or that the state
regulations violate state law. In such cases, where the state has discretion to determine entitlements, there is no deprivation of a federally guaranteed right.
Other claims raised at fair hearings, however, do provide a basis for a § 1983 action. First, one could claim that a local official's
interpretation of the Social Security Act or federal regulations or
his policy decision or rule violated that act, the federal regulations,
or the Constitution. 26 Second, one could claim that a state regulation promulgated by the Social Services Department violated the
Social Security Act, a federal regulation, or the Constitution.2 7 Finally, one could claim that a state law violated the Social Security
Act, a federal regulation, or the Constitution.2"
If a claimant had decided to forgo a fair hearing and had won
on any of the above claims in a state or federal court action, fees
would be awarded under § 1988. However, the claimant who decides to use the fair hearing mechanism and who prevails cannot
recover fees. This is true despite the similarity of § 1983 claims in
fair hearings and court actions.
The Supreme Court cases that bar fee awards in administrative fair hearings will be discussed in section II and criticized in
sections III and IV. Absent these bars, however, fee awards for fair
hearings could easily be modeled on those for court actions. For
instance, an AFDC participant could win either at the fair hearing
itself or in a court action on appeal of an adverse determination at
the hearing. In the former case, the claimant would bring a separate action to recover fees from the county official against whom
11

See Stark v Wyman, 59 Misc 2d 504, 506, 299 NYS2d 686 (Sup Ct 1969), in which an

AFDC recipient challenged the New York City Department of Social Service's decision to
deny her an increased food allowance to purchase kosher food as a violation of equal protection and a denial of freedom of religion.
2'7 See Reid v Toia, 72 App Div 2d 465, 468, 424 NYS2d 964 (1980), in which the court
found that subdivision (b) of section 352.26 of the state regulations was invalid because it
was "in conflict with the Federal Social Security Act and the HEW regulations promulgated
under it." See also Johnson v Blum, 58 NY2d 454, 448 NE2d 449 (1983), where the court
found that the State Commissioner's administrative directive that differentiated recipients
from applicants for the purposes of determining whether parents are obligated to dispose of
non-essential assets violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
28 See Blake v Berger, 85 Misc 2d 865, 380 NYS2d 575 (Sup Ct 1976), in which petitioners claimed (though they did not prevail) that New York Social Services Law §§ 321 and
322, which allowed termination of benefits solely because of a recipient's refusal to execute a

mortgage on real property, violated the Social Security Act by imposing additional and unauthorized eligibility standards for AFDC qualification.
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she prevailed in the fair hearing. 29 This action could be brought
either in state or federal court.3 0
If the claimant loses at the fair hearing, she could appeal the
decision to the state court3 1 or she could bring a § 1983 action in
federal district court based on the same underlying claim. 2 If she
wins in state or federal court, fees would be awarded against the
state commissioner pursuant to § 1988 not only for the time spent
on the court action, but 33for the time expended on § 1983 claims in

the fair hearing as well.

20 In Monell v Department of Social Services, 436 US 658 (1978), the Court held that
local governmental bodies, which includes counties, are persons under § 1983 and can be
sued directly for declaratory and injunctive relief. Furthermore, local governmental officials
may be sued in their official capacities for such relief. This means that the court can assess
attorney's fees against such officials in their official capacities. See Sheldon H. Nahmod,
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Litigation: The Law of Section 1983 57 (Shepard's/McGraw
Hill, 2d ed 1986).
20 In Martinez v California, 444 US 277, 283 (1980), the Court noted that the states
have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 claims. In Thiboutot, 448 US 1, the Court held that
state courts are authorized to award fees under § 1988. The New York Court of Appeals
reiterated the Thiboutot holding in Johnson v Blum, 58 NY2d 454, 457-458, 448 NE2d 449
(1983).
31 In New York, judicial review of agency action is known as an "article 78 proceeding,"
authorized by NY Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7801 et seq (McKinney 1981) and heard
by a trial level court. The scope of review under article 78 is narrow; it is limited to a
substantial evidence review, an arbitrary and capricious standard, or an abuse of discretion
standard, depending on the question raised. See Pietranicov Ambach, 82 App Div 2d 625,
442 NYS2d 827 (1981), aff'd 55 NY2d 861, 447 NYS2d 924, 432 NE2d 796 (1982). Such
actions might be preferred to a federal court action, since the article 78 proceeding is procedurally much simpler.
32 Plaintiff may prefer to bring an action in state court since, under Edelman v Jordan,
415 US 651 (1974), plaintiff will not receive retroactive relief if she prevails in a suit against
a state official in federal court. See note 8. New York, however, authorizes such relief. See
Schimmel v Reed, 50 App Div 2d 1085, 377 NYS2d 313 (1975), aff'd 40 NY2d 887, 389
NYS2d 361, 357 NE2d 1016 (1976).
22 Though fees may be awarded in federal court for statutory § 1983 cases, such awards
may give rise to problems in conjunction with federal officials' immunity from retroactive
relief under the Eleventh Amendment. In Hutto v Finney, 437 US 678 (1978), the Court
held that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity will not shield federal officials from
paying attorney's fees to plaintiffs who succeed in federal court § 1983 actions brought to
vindicate constitutional rights. Hutto did not examine the Eleventh Amendment issue in
the context of statutory-based § 1983 claims, and the Court specifically declined to reach
the issue in Maher v Gagne, 448 US 122, 130 (1980). One possible basis for the Court's
decision in Hutto was its finding that in passing § 1988, Congress was exercising its power
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to set aside the states' immunity from retroactive
relief. 437 US at 639. Under this reading of Hutto, when § 1983 claims are brought to enforce statutory and not constitutional rights, Congress may not have waived the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Thiboutot, 448 US at 9 n 7. Alternatively, if the basis for
the Court's decision was that fees should be regarded simply as "costs," then the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar a fee award even in statutory-based claims, for costs do not constitute retroactive relief, but are rather a reimbursement to the plaintiff "for a portion of the
expenses he incurred in seeking prospective relief." 437 US at 695 n 24. One commentator
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C. Fee Awards for Multiclaim Fair Hearings
Claimants who only raise and prevail on claims under the Social Security Act or the Constitution present the clearest case for
allowing fees under § 1988. However, at many AFDC hearings,
claimants may raise more than one claim. For instance, a claimant
may allege that the department's actions violated both the state
and federal social security laws, 4 or that the department violated a
state statute as well as a constitutionally guaranteed right of due
35
process or equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Under current law, if such a claimant had decided to forgo a
hearing and had brought multiple claims in court, fees could be
awarded under § 1988 even if the case were decided simply on
state law grounds.3 The law governing fee awards in multiclaim
court litigation grew out of language in the House Report accompanying § 1988,'3 which the courts subsequently applied in deciding such cases. The reasoning that applies to multiclaim court actions could be extended to allow fees for multiclaim fair hearings.
1. Fee claims based on statutory violations.
The House Report first sets forth the rule governing fee
awards for cases in which a plaintiff joins a non-fee claim with a
statutory-based § 1988 claim. It states: "To the extent a plaintiff
joins a claim under one of the statutes enumerated in H.R. 15460
[§ 1988] with a claim that does not allow attorney fees, that plaintiff, if it prevails on the non-fee claim, is entitled to a determination on the other claim for the purpose of awarding counsel fees."3 9
This rule could be applied to fair hearings as well. For instance, suppose a claimant raises both a state law and a statutory §
has argued that even if the holding of Hutto was based on Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers, the Eleventh Amendment should still not bar fees for statutory §
1983 claims. See Comment, Civil Rights Attorney's Fees in Cases Resolved on State Pendent and Federal Statutory Grounds, 130 U Pa L Rev 488, 507-512 (1981).
U See, for example, Reid v Toia, 72 App Div 2d 465.
11 See, for example, Stark v Wyman, 59 Misc 2d 504, 505, 299 NYS2d 686 (Sup Ct
1969).
" For a discussion of the permutations of multiclaim litigation, see Arthur D. Wolf,
Pendent Jurisdiction,Multi-Claim Litigation, and the 1976 Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act, 2 W New Eng L Rev 193 (1979).
37 The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, HR Rep 94-1558, 94th Cong,
2d Sess 4 n 7 (1976) ("House Report") reprinted in Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act
of 1976, Source Book: Legislative History, Texts, and Other Documents, 94th Cong, 2d
Sess, Committee Print 209, 212 ("Source Book').
11 This would include statutory § 1983 claims based on the Social Security Act.
3 House Report at 4 n 7, reprinted in Source Book at 212 (cited in note 37).
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1983 claim in a fair hearing, and the examiner awards relief only
upon finding a violation of the state welfare law. For the purposes
of the fee award, the court awarding fees would have to determine
whether the action in question also violated the federal act.4 0 If
plaintiffs are not entitled to such a determination, they may be
discouraged from bringing meritorious state statutory non-fee
claims at the hearing out of concern that such claims will provide
the basis for the hearing officer's decision. If such claimants lose in
the fair hearing, they may be barred by the state's appellate rules
from raising those non-fee claims in state court on appeal, 1 and by
the Eleventh Amendment from bringing them as pendant claims in
a subsequent federal court action.42
2. Fee claims based on constitutional violations.
Another rule in the House Report involves the situation in
which a non-fee claim is joined with a constitutional fee-generating
claim. The House Report notes:
In some instances, however, the claim with fees may involve a
constitutional question which the courts are reluctant to resolve if the non-constitutional claim is dispositive. Hagans v.
Lavine. In such cases, if the claim for which fees may be
awarded meets the "substantiality" test, see Hagans v. Lavine, United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, attorney's fees may be
allowed even though the court declines to enter judgment for
the plaintiff on that claim, so long as the plaintiff prevails on
the non-fee claim arising out of a "common nucleus of operative fact." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.'3
40 The determination would be the same if the claimant prevailed on appeal from an
adverse decision at the fair hearing.
" Article 78 proceedings are limited to review of the issues presented in fair hearings.
See note 31.
42 In Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v Halderman, 465 US 89, 97-124 (1984), the
Court held that federal courts have no jurisdiction over state law claims seeking injunctive
relief against state officials regardless of the federal court's original basis for subject matter
jurisdiction. Thus, pendent jurisdiction is not a basis for extending federal jurisdiction over
such state law claims.
" House Report at 4 n 7 (citations omitted), reprinted in Source Book at 212 (cited in
note 37). In Hagans v Lavine, 425 US 528 (1974), the "substantiality" test was used to
determine whether a constitutional claim was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a district
court hearing a group of federal and non-federal claims. In order for jurisdiction to be appropriate, the case must present a claim that is not "wholly insubstantial" or "obviously
frivolous." Id at 537. In United Mine Workers v Gibbs, 383 US 715 (1966), the requirement
that state and federal claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact" was used as
part of the test for determining when a federal court has the power to hear pendent state
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In Maher v Gagne," the Supreme Court applied the language
in the House Report to award fees in a § 1983 suit in which the
plaintiff alleged that the state's AFDC regulations violated the Social Security Act as well as the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 Although the plaintiff's
constitutional claim was never adjudicated (the case was settled by
consent decree), the court found that it met the substantiality test
of Hagans v Lavine and awarded fees based on that claim.46
Suppose that, in an AFDC fair hearing, a claimant challenges
the county's decision to withdraw benefits because of her alleged
cohabitation with a man other than her husband. The claimant argues both that state "substitute father" regulations47 violate the
Equal Protection Clause and that she is not in fact engaged in an
ongoing illicit relationship. She presents testimony on both claims
and asks under each that her benefits be restored. She prevails on
the factual issue and the constitutional claim is not reached. Under
the Hagans and Gibbs test and Maher holding, fees would be
awarded because the constitutional claim was "substantial" and
'48
both claims arose from a "common nucleus of operative fact.
In Smith v Robinson,49 the Court restricted the scope of the
Hagans test relied on in Maher, holding that a plaintiff seeking to
recover fees "may not rely simply on the fact that substantial feegenerating claims were made during the course of the litigation. ' 50
The Court held that if the unadjudicated constitutional claim was
based on facts and legal theories different from those underlying
the non-fee claim, and particularly if the constitutional claim warranted different relief, it could not be the basis of a fee award. 51
claims. Id at 725. One should note that for purposes of § 1988, the Hagans and Gibbs tests
are not used to determine jurisdiction, but only act as a rule for the courts to apply when
awarding fees in multiclaim litigation involving federal constitutional issues.
44 448 US 122 (1980).
" Id at 133 n 15.
4' Though the plaintiff's statutory § 1983 claim would have supported a fee
award
under Thiboutot as well, the court chose to base the fee award on the constitutional claim in
order to avoid any Eleventh Amendment difficulties. See note 33.
1 Under substitute father regulations (invalidated in King v Smith, 392 US 309
(1968)), AFDC payments were denied "to the children of a mother who 'cohabits' in or
outside her home with any single or married able-bodied man." Id at 311. For purposes of
benefits, the man was considered to be the "substitute father" of all the mother's children,
regardless of whether he was legally obligated to support them or contributed to their support. Id at 314.
" See note 43 and accompanying text.
49 468 US 992 (1984).
50 Id at 1007.
51 Id at 1015.
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The impact of Smith is unclear. Congress overturned its specific statutory holding, 52 and it is uncertain how Smith's test for
fee awards would apply to different fact patterns. For the hypothetical claimant discussed above, fees would be awarded if the
court focused on the similarity of the relief requested, but denied
if it focused on the different legal theories behind the claims. 3
Given this uncertainty, claimants with strong constitutional claims
can only guarantee fee recovery by raising those claims in a separate proceeding. In practice, this phenomenon, plus the superior
expertise of courts in constitutional matters, will ensure that most
claimants continue to bring constitutional claims in courts rather
than at fair hearings.
II. SUPREME

COURT DECISIONS ON ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

Though the scheme described above could be used to award
attorney's fees for fair hearings to claimants who ultimately prevail, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the award of attorney's fees for administrative proceedings makes it unlikely that
any such awards will be granted. This section discusses the three
major Supreme Court cases that have developed this jurisprudence: New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v Carey,54 Webb v Dyer
County Bd. of Ed. ,5 and North CarolinaDept. of Transp. v Crest
" In Smith v Robinson, the Court disallowed attorney's fees to parties who prevail in
actions to enforce the Education of the Handicapped Act ("EHA"), 20 USC § 1400 et seq
(1982). In response to this decision, Congress passed the Handicapped Children's Protection
Act of 1976 ("HCPA"), Pub L No 99-372, 100 Stat 796, codified at 20 USCA § 1415 (Supp
1988), which gave courts the power to award attorney's fees to parties who prevail in administrative and court proceedings to enforce the EHA.
53 Before Smith v Robinson, a fear that the Gibbs standard would allow fees for too
many unlitigated constitutional claims prompted the Eighth Circuit in Dernheim v Hennepin, 524 F Supp 1321 (D Minn 1981), aff'd 688 F2d 66 (8th Cir 1982), to deny fees for
administrative proceedings. In Dernheim, plaintiffs contested suspension of a foster family
home license on constitutional and state statutory grounds. The court wrote:
The administrative agency applicable in a particular case may deal with a much different array of issues. For example, in the instant case the issue decided by the state
hearing examiner involved sufficiency of the evidence tending to show whether the
plaintiffs were unfit to be foster parents. The issue in a section 1983 lawsuit would have
been whether the plaintiffs had a property or liberty right in their FFH license and, if
so, whether the county had complied with the requirements of the due process clause.
Although the same nucleus of facts are involved, the issues presented are much
different.
524 F Supp at 1324.
447 US 54 (1980).
55 471 US 234 (1985).
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Street Community Council, Inc.56

A. Title VII Proceedings: New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v Carey
The Court's first case on the availability of fees for administrative proceedings was Carey, a suit brought under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 Title VII, which contains its own
attorney's fees provision, 58 is one of the few Civil Rights statutes
that require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before
bringing an action in federal district court. 5 The remedial scheme

of Title VII requires the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), the federal agency that handles Title VII complaints, to defer all complaints brought against private employers
or state and local governments to state or local fair employment
practice agencies.6 This deferral system reflects Congress's attempt to ensure that the federal government, in taking charge of
employment practices, would not usurp regulatory functions traditionally left to the states. 1
Carey concerned an employment discrimination claim brought
under Title VII. As required by section 706(c) of that title,62 the
EEOC referred the respondent's complaint to the appropriate New
5 479 US 6 (1986).
'T 42 USC § 2000e et seq (1982).
42 USC § 2000e-5(k)(1982) provides:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall
be liable for costs the same as a private person.
"' There is no similar requirement that the plaintiff exhaust state judicial remedies,
presumably because state court proceedings will rarely be over within 60 days of the complaint's filing, the point at which the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has jurisdiction over the complaint. See Andrea Catania, State Employment DiscriminationRemedies and Pendent Jurisdictionunder Title VII: Access to Federal Courts, 32 Am U L Rev
777, 819 (1983).
"0These agencies, called 706 agencies (since they are mentioned in Section 706 of Title
VII), are listed in the EEOC regulations at 29 CFR § 1601.74 (1987). A complainant who
resides in a location that has a 706 agency must file his complaint first with that agency and
may not file with the EEOC until 60 days after proceedings with the state commission have
commenced unless these proceedings are terminated earlier. If a complainant mistakenly
files with the EEOC, the commission will send the complaint to the 706 agency and hold its
own complaint in "suspended animation" until the 60 day period is up. See Love v Pullman
Co., 404 US 522, 526 (1972). According to the BNA Labor Relations Report, 8a Fair Employment Practices Manual 451:1 (1987), more than 60 percent of complaints received by
the EEOC each year are deferred under this scheme.
"' This deferral period was also designed to ensure that "states and localities be afforded every opportunity to resolve ... difficult problems of racial justice by means of their
own agencies and instrumentalities." 110 Cong Rec 12724-25 (June 4, 1964).
6"42 USC § 2000e-5(d) (1982).
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York administrative agency. While the state action was pending,
the respondent, after receiving a right to sue letter from the
EEOC, filed a complaint in district court. The respondent prevailed at the administrative level, and the Appellate Division of
the New York Supreme Court ultimately upheld the decision of
the State Human Rights Appeals Board. Pursuant to an agreement
between the parties, the district court action was dismissed except
for the respondent's request for attorney's fees. The district court
denied the fee request, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that "[a] complaining party who is successful in
state administrative proceedings after having her complaint under
Title VII referred to a state agency in accordance with the statutory scheme of that Title is entitled to recover attorney's fees in
6' 3
the same manner as a party who prevails in federal court.
The Supreme Court upheld the court of appeals. It based its
reasoning on two considerations. The first was the language of the
attorney's fees provision itself. The Court noted that "[t]he words
of § 706(k) leave little doubt that fee awards are authorized for
legal work done in 'proceedings' other than court actions. Congress's use of the broadly inclusive disjunctive phrase 'action or
proceeding' indicates an intent to subject the losing party to an
award of attorney's fees and costs that includes expenses incurred
for administrative proceedings." 4
Second, the Court noted that under Title VII's comprehensive
enforcement scheme, resort to state and local remedies is
mandatory, and that plaintiffs may file suit in federal district court
only if the state does not provide prompt or complete relief.6 5 The
Court apparently concluded that it would be unfair to deny a
plaintiff fees after forcing her to exhaust administrative remedies.
In Carey, the Court made it clear that fee requests of plaintiffs
who prevail in private sector Title VII administrative proceedings
should ordinarily be granted. Lower courts prior to Carey had already allowed attorney's fees for Title VII administrative proceedings involving federal employees. 66 Since Carey, lower courts have

598 F2d 1253, 1260 (2d Cir 1979).
447 US at 61. Other attorney's fees provisions do not include any reference to "proceedings." See, for example, § 204(b) of Title II, 42 USC § 2000a-3(b) (1982) and § 7 of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 USC § 626(b)(1982), which incorporates
the fee provisions of § 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 USC § 216(b) (1982).
65 447 US at 65.
66 Fees were awarded in Hammond v Balzano, 10 Empl Prac Dec (CCH) § 10333 (D DC
1975); McMullen v Warner, 416 F Supp 1163, 1167 (D DC 1976); Reyes v Mathews, 428 F
Supp 300, 302 (D DC 1976); Parkerv Califano, 561 F2d 320, 332-333 (DC Cir 1977); Foster
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allowed fees for public and private plaintiffs proceeding under Title VII 7
B.

§ 1983 Proceedings: Webb v Dyer County Bd. of Ed.

The language governing the award of attorney's fees under §
1988 is essentially identical to that of Title VII. 8 While there is no
evidence that Congress considered the issue of attorney's fees in
the context of administrative proceedings, the legislative history of
§ 1988 makes it clear that Congress sought to model it after Title
VII and to apply the law that had grown up around Title VII to fee
petitions brought under § 1988.69 In the area of fee awards for administrative proceedings, however, the Court has not applied the
same rules to fee shifting under the two statutes.
Fee awards under § 1988 for administrative proceedings to enforce § 1983 are governed by Webb v Dyer County Bd. of Ed.'0 and
North CarolinaDept. of Transp. v Crest Street Community Council, Inc."1 In Webb, the Court examined the substantive question of
what constitutes "proceedings to enforce § 1983." In Crest, the

F2d 340, 343 (DC Cir 1977); Smith v Califano, 446 F Supp 530, 533-534 (D
DC 1978); Brown v Bathke, 588 F2d 634, 638 (8th Cir 1978); and Fischer v Adams, 572 F2d
406, 409 (1st Cir 1978). Prior to 1978, private enforcement was the only means by which
federal employees could enforce their rights under Title VII. In light of this, the DC Circuit
noted in Parkerthat courts should be particularly willing to use fee shifting to encourage
such enforcement. 561 F2d at 331. However, the Presidential Reorganization Plan 1 of 1978,
43 Fed Reg 19807 (1978), 92 Stat 3781, reprinted in 42 USCA § 2000e-4 (1981), authorized
the Attorney General or the EEOC to bring suits on behalf of federal employees, thereby
making remedies for federal employees coextensive with those of other employees protected
under Title VII.
"7Private employees have been awarded fees under Title VII in Bennett v Central
Telephone Co. of Ill., 619 F Supp 640, 645 (N D Ill 1985) (fees allowed for proceeding before
Illinois FEP Commission) and Lenihan v City of New York, 640 F Supp 822, 830 (S D NY
1986) (fees allowed for proceedings before Commission on Human Rights and EEOC). In
Sullivan v Com.of Pa. Dept. of Labor, Etc., 663 F2d 443, 445-446 (3d Cir 1981) and Chrapliwy v Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F2d 760, 763 (7th Cir 1982), the court awarded fees when the
concurrently filed court action served as a catalyst that enabled the plaintiff to prevail in
administrative proceedings.
68 Compare the text of § 1988 (cited in note 2) with that of Title VII's attorney fee
provision (cited in note 58).
69 See Statement of Rep. Drinan at 122 Cong Rec 35,122 (Oct 1, 1976); Senate Report
at 4-5, reprinted in 1976 USCCAN at 5911-5912 (cited in note 2); House Report at 8, reprinted in Source Book at 216 (cited in note 37); Hensley v Eckerhart, 461 US 424, 433 n 7
(1983). The legislative history of § 1988 contains no mention of administrative proceedings.
Passage of the bill was preceded by very little debate as both the House and Senate rushed
to pass it before the end of the session. See Comment, 130 U Pa L Rev at 495 n 34 (cited in
note 33).

v Boorstin, 561

70

471 US 234 (1985).

71 479 US 6 (1986).
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Court examined the procedural question of whether a separate suit
could be brought in federal court solely to request attorney's fees.
In Webb, the Court disallowed fees for state administrative
proceedings prior to a § 1983 action upon finding that the proceedings did not advance the § 1983 litigation in court. The plaintiff, a
black schoolteacher with tenure, was dismissed from his job without notice. After his dismissal, he sought a hearing, guaranteed to
him by Tennessee state law, before the Dyer County School Board.
He appeared with his attorney at several Board hearings and alleged both that the Board had failed to follow proper procedures
before dismissing him and that his dismissal was racially motivated. After a series of hearings, the Board refused to reinstate
him. Webb then filed an action in federal district court alleging
violations of §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985. The case was settled by
a consent decree under which Webb received damages and was reinstated to his job. He received attorney's fees for the time his attorney spent on the court action, but was denied fees for his attorney's time in administrative proceedings. The court of appeals
affirmed the denial of fees.
Webb advanced two theories before the Supreme Court in
support of his fee request: 1) that the hearings constituted "proceedings to enforce § 1983" within the meaning of § 1988, and 2)
that the time spent in the hearings was time reasonably expended
in preparation for the court action and therefore compensable
under the rule of Hensley v Eckerhart.72 The Court dismissed
Webb's first theory. It did not examine what claims Webb actually
put forth in the administrative proceedings to enforce tenure
rights, 73 but concluded that since petitioner could have bypassed
the School Board proceedings and gone directly to court with his
§1983 claim, those proceedings did not have the same integral
function under § 1983 that state administrative proceedings had
under Title VII.7 4 The Court based its holding on the theory that

optional proceedings cannot be "proceedings to enforce" one of the
72 461 US 424 (1983). In Hensley, the Court stated that "[t]he most useful starting

point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably
expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Id at 433. Petitioners in
Webb urged a reading of Hensley to require fees for all work "from the onset of an attorneyclient relationship... reasonably related to the enforcement of federal civil rights." 471 US
at 242. The Court stressed that the rule of Hensley only requires fees for the time that is
"'reasonably expended on the litigation." Id (emphasis in original).
73 Petitioners brief shows that Webb's counsel raised both equal protection and due
process objections to the discharge. Brief for Petitioners, 83-1360 at 4. But see Respondent's
Brief, id at 9 n 6.
7" 471 US at 241, citing Smith v Robinson, 468 US 992, 1011 n 14 (1984).
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statutes listed in § 1988, since such proceedings are not undertaken
pursuant to requirements imposed by the statutes themselves. The
Court held that "the District Court's decision to deny any fees for
time spent pursuing optional administrative remedies was well
within the range of reasonable discretion.""
The Court also rejected Webb's second theory. It stated that
the relevant question to ask in determining fee awards for optional
administrative proceedings is whether the work was "both useful
and of a type ordinarily necessary to advance the civil rights litigation to the stage it reached before settlement. 7' The Court acknowledged that in certain cases administrative proceedings could
provide a substitute for trial preparation. If the proceedings obviated the need for out-of-court procedures, they would be compensable even though they occurred before the filing of a complaint in
district court. However, it refused to find that § 1988 covered preparations for the proceedings themselves. The Court concluded that
"[t]he five years of work before August 1979 [related to the administrative proceedings] were easily separated from the two years of
work thereafter 7 7 and denied fees for the administrative proceedings in their entirety.
Prior to Webb, some courts had allowed fee awards for administrative actions under § 1983.8 Since Webb, no court has allowed
fees. 79 Such refusals have several bases. In some post-Webb cases,
courts denied fees because the administrative proceedings could
not be characterized as proceedings to enforce § 1983. For instance,
in certain cases the constitutional § 1983 claim arose out of a de-

76

Id at 244.
Id at 243.

77

Id.

71

7'Ciechon v City of Chicago, 686 F2d 511, 525 (7th Cir 1982). In Turillo v Tyson, 535 F
Supp 577, 588 (D RI 1982), fees were awarded under § 1988 when the plaintiff was required
to exhaust EHA remedies in order to prevail on her constitutional claims under § 1983.
7 See, for example, Leroy v City of Houston, 831 F2d 576 (5th Cir 1987), reh denied
836 F2d 1346 (1987) and cert denied 108 S Ct 1735 (1988) (fees denied under § 1988 for
services performed before the Justice Department for preclearance submissions in an action
to enforce voting guarantees of Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, reversing lower
court's fee award, 648 F Supp 537, 542 (S D Texas 1986)); McCullough v Cady, 640 F Supp
1012, 1025 (E D Mich 1986) (fees denied for state administrative action claiming violation of
due process rights in hearings before Michigan Department of Corrections Hearing Division); Healy v Town of Pembroke Park, 643 F Supp 1208, 1216-17 (S D Fla 1986), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part 831 F2d 989 (11th Cir 1987) (policemen denied fees for administrative
proceedings prior to § 1983 suit against city); Lenihan v City of New York, 640 F Supp 822,
830-31 (S D NY 1986) (fees denied for proceedings under § 1983 before Article II Medical
Board); Kuhns v City of Commerce City, 618 F Supp 1475, 1479 (D C Colo 1985) (police
officer protesting denial of due process in termination procedure denied fees for counsel's
work at state administrative level).
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nial of due process at the hearing itself. Thus it necessarily was not
adjudicated in the hearing.80 In other cases, the plaintiff did not
even raise the § 1983 claims in the state proceedings. 8 In still
other cases, courts did not examine the nature of the claims, but
simply held that Webb precludes an award of fees. 2 A final reason
courts have rejected fee petitions has been a finding that § 1988
bars a plaintiff who prevailed at the administrative level from
bringing a separate action for fees.8 3 This is the reading of § 1988
that the Supreme Court adopted in North Carolina Dept. of
Transp. v Crest Street Community Council, Inc. 4
C. Separate Actions for Fees: North Carolina Dept. of Transp. v
Crest Street Community Council, Inc.
Webb concerned a fee request by a plaintiff who was unsuccessful in administrative proceedings, but who ultimately prevailed
in a court action. Therefore, the Court did not reach the question
of whether § 1988 allows a separate action solely for fees. In Crest,
however, the Court concluded that a plaintiff who had prevailed in
an earlier administrative proceeding could not bring an action in
federal court solely for fees.
In Crest, respondents claimed that the North Carolina Department of Transportation's ("NCDOT") decision to build an extension of a major highway through a black neighborhood violated
Title VI. 5 The respondents filed a complaint with the United
8o

See, for example, Lenihan, 640 F Supp at 831 ("Those proceedings [before an Article

II Medical Board] were not part of the statutory remedy for redress of a prior wrong, they
were part of the wrong complained of in plaintiff's federal civil rights action") (emphasis in
original); Venuti v Riordan, 702 F2d 6, 9 (1st Cir 1983) (tavern owners who claimed they
had been denied due process in a hearing to obtain a license could not claim that the license
hearing itself was a proceeding to enforce § 1983). These cases can be contrasted with
Ciechon, 686 F2d 511 (equal protection and due process claim brought under § 1983 by
paramedic discharged from her job), a pre-Webb decision, in which the Court awarded fees
though the due process violation occurred in the hearing itself. The court noted that the
plaintiff's counsel "repeatedly raised objections to the procedures used and the evidence
presented in the hearing.... Lack of due process was specifically raised and equal protection at least inferentially raised, thus warranting relief under 42 USC § 1988." Id at 525.
81 Healy, 643 F Supp at 1216-17 (policemen denied fees for administrative proceedings
in § 1983 suit against city where state proceedings involved alleged violations of state labor
relations law).
82 See, for example, Leroy, 831 F2d 576.
83 See Blow v Lascaris, 523 F Supp 913, 917 (N D NY 1981), aff'd 668 F2d 670 (2d Cir
1982); Horacek v Thone, 710 F2d 496, 499 (8th Cir 1983) (refusing to extend Carey and
denying fees to attorney who represented parents in proceedings before State Department
of Public Institutions).
81 479 US 6 (1986).
86 42 USC § 2000d et seq (1982). Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
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States Department of Transportation ("DOT") pursuant to regulations that the agency had promulgated under Title VI.86 After an
investigation, the DOT made a preliminary finding of "reasonable
cause" and urged the parties to enter into negotiations. These negotiations resulted in a Final Mitigation Plan which, among other
things, would preserve the community church and park. When the
NCDOT denied liability for attorney's fees incurred in negotiating
the plan, the respondents filed suit in district court requesting fees
under § 1988 for 12,000 hours of counsel's time spent over a five
year period of negotiations.87 The Supreme Court did not examine
whether the negotiations under Title VI were "proceedings" within
the meaning of § 1988.88 Instead, the Court held that a federal
court may not award attorney's fees in an independent action that
does not seek to enforce any of the civil rights laws listed in §
1988.89 Examining the language of § 1988, the Court found that it
authorized collection of fees for an action or proceeding only in
"the court" that heard the action 0 Hence, the court that awards
the attorney's fees must be the same court in which a complaint
that includes a civil rights violation is filed." A plaintiff may not
recover attorney's fees for proceedings in another forum even if
they led to a vindication of her rights.

III. AN

ARGUMENT FOR FEE AWARDS IN

AFDC

FAIR HEARINGS

The Carey, Webb, and Crest decisions indicate that the Court
would not allow fees for AFDC fair hearings. Specifically, the
color, or national origin, under any program receiving federal financial assistance.
49 CFR § 21.11(b) (1987).
8 479 US at 10.
8 For a discussion of this question as well as of the holding in Crest, see Note, The
Supreme Court's Interpretationof Section 1988 and Awards of Attorney's Fees for Work
Performed in Administrative Proceedings:A Proposalfor a Result-Oriented Approach, 62
Wash L Rev 889 (1987). The respondents in Crest also claimed fees as intervenors in a
related suit filed by an environmental group, ECOS, Inc. After ECOS entered a consent
judgment, the Crest respondents requested fees for counsel's time during their negotiations
with the NCDOT. Since they had obtained, through the consent judgment, some of the
relief they sought in the Title VI negotiations, the district court held that those negotiations
constituted "proceedings to enforce Title VI" and awarded fees for the Crest respondent's
limited success in district court. ECOS, Inc. v Brinegar, 671 F Supp 381 (M D NC 1987).
89 479 US at 12.
o Id. One commentator has noted that the Court's conclusion from the language of the
statute is grounded on "an erroneous paraphrasing of § 1988." The Court paraphrased the
statute's reference to "any action or proceeding" to enforce civil rights as "the action or
proceeding" (emphasis added) to enforce civil rights, thus "[linking] a court's award of attorney's fees to consideration of the merits of the civil rights violation by the same court in
the same action or proceeding." Note, 62 Wash L Rev at 900 (cited in note 88).
" 479 US at 12.
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Court would focus on the optional nature of such proceedings,
treat them as non-integral to the enforcement process of federally
guaranteed rights, and thus deny fees. This section argues that
such a result is unwarranted for two reasons. First, contrary to the
Court's view, proceedings can be both optional as well as integral
to an enforcement process. Second, awarding fees in the fair hearing context would reform the incentive structure so as to discourage needless litigation and improve local administration of AFDC.
A. A Critique of the Optional/Non-optional Distinction
Two views of administrative proceedings emerge from the Supreme Court cases regarding fee awards. One view, based on Title
VII and articulated in Carey, sees administrative proceedings as
playing an integral role in civil rights enforcement. Fees for such
proceedings are allowed. Another view, based on statutes covered
by § 1988, such as § 1983, sees administrative proceedings as
largely unrelated to civil rights enforcement in federal court. This
latter view was made explicit in Webb.
The extent to which Webb forecloses fee awards for fair hearings depends on whether the Court's holding was based on a finding that the proceedings at issue in the case are not integral to
enforcement of § 1983 actions, or instead, that such proceedings
are optional for the claimant who wishes to bring a §1983 action in
court. If the Court decided Webb on the basis of the non-integral
nature of the proceedings, then the case can be read narrowly and
confined to its facts. Its holding is then captured in the Court's
statement that "[a]dministrative proceedings established to enforce tenure rights created by state law simply are not any part of
the proceedings to enforce § 1983. " 92 Such a reading suggests that
the holding in Webb would not foreclose attorney's fees for fair
hearings. For, in contrast to the proceedings at issue in Webb, fair
hearings are part of a federal scheme of enforcing a federally guaranteed right. Though they are state run and optional, they are
clearly also a forum for § 1983 claims. The mere fact that a claimant is not required to exhaust the fair hearing remedy before going
to court would not mean that the proceedings are governed by
Webb.
In contrast, if the Court's holding relied primarily on the optional nature of the proceedings, then the role that they actually
play in the enforcement of § 1983 becomes irrelevant. All that mat92

471 US at 241.
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ters is that a claimant need not exhaust them before bringing a §
1983 action in federal court. This broad reading of Webb is captured in the Court's statement that "[because § 1983 stands 'as an
independent avenue of relief and petitioner 'could go straight to
court to assert it' the school board proceedings in this case simply
do not have the same integral function under §1983 that state administrative proceedings have under Title VII. '9 3 If the Webb
Court means to say that "optional" should always be read to mean
"non-integral" then Webb must preclude an award of fees for work
done in fair hearings as well.
Such a holding relies on the notion that in the absence of an
exhaustion requirement, there is no evidence that Congress wished
to encourage vindication of § 1983 rights through administrative
proceedings. 4 But to focus on the initial congressional enforcement scheme of § 1983 ignores the changes in § 1983 litigation that
have occurred since the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was passed.9 5 During the Reconstruction Era, when "the Federal Government was
clearly established as a guarantor of the basic federal rights of individuals against incursions by state power," 96 one of Congress's
primary objectives was to provide citizens seeking redress from unconstitutional state action direct access to federal courts. This was
one of the goals of § 1983.
Since that time, state administrative agencies have taken a
large role in implementing and enforcing federal statutes," and
Thiboutot has extended § 1983 to statutory claims. As a result, §
1983 now encompasses a large variety of claims that the 1871 Congress did not anticipate.9 "
Despite changes in § 1983 litigation, the Court has continued
to defer to the statute's historic goal of providing direct access to
federal courts and has refused to require exhaustion of administrative or state court remedies. 9 In Patsy v Florida Board of Re-

Id, citing Smith v Robinson, 468 US 992, 1011 n 14 (1984).
94 Id.
95 Section 1 of that Act, 17 Stat 13, was the precursor of § 1983.
96 Patsy v Florida Board of Regents, 457 US 496, 503-504 (1982).
1' See the appendix to Justice Powell's dissent in Maine v Thiboutot, 448 US at 34-37,
listing a number of federal-state joint programs.
"' See Patsy, 457 US at 507, where the Court notes that "the 1871 Congress ... was
[not] aware of the potential role of state administrative agencies."
"' Monroe v Pape, 365 US 167, 174-180 (1961) (overruled in part by Monell v Dept. of
Social Services, 436 US 658 (1978)) (refusing to require exhaustion of state judicial remedies); McNeese v Board of Education, 373 US 668, 671-73 (1963); and Patsy, 457 US at 500516 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion of state administrative remedies). In one instance,
Congress has responded to these changes in § 1983 litigation. In 1980, Congress passed 42
93
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gents,100 however, the Court voiced doubts about the continuing
viability of non-exhaustion:
[T]here is serious disagreement over whether judicial or administrative procedures offer § 1983 plaintiffs the swiftest,
least costly, and most reliable remedy ....

Similarly there is

debate over whether the specialization of federal courts in
constitutional law is more important than the specialization of
administrative agencies in their areas of expertise, and over
whether the symbolic and institutional function of federal
courts in defining, legitimatizing, and enforcing constitutional
claims outweighs the educational function that state and local
agencies can serve. 10 '
If the Court is right in suspecting that non-exhaustion is no
longer viable, then it is hard to see how administrative proceedings
such as fair hearings are "unrelated" to the enforcement of § 1983.
At the very least, optional proceedings and integral proceedings
should not be treated as mutually exclusive.
B. Combatting Incentives to Bypass Administrative Proceedings
Aside from misapprehending the integral role that administrative proceedings play in enforcing § 1983, the Court's current jurisprudence also creates two incentive problems. First, potential
plaintiffs are encouraged to file suit in federal court even when administrative proceedings would be more suitable. Second, given the
holding in Crest, a plaintiff who does decide to pursue optional
administrative remedies has no incentive to resolve her dispute
solely through administrative proceedings. She always has an incentive to file suit concurrently in federal court to preserve her
right to attorney's fees in the event that she prevails on the administrative level. 10 2 The Court in Crest indicated that even if all substantive claims are mooted by action on the administrative level, a
USC § 1997e which creates a specific, limited exhaustion requirement for the largest class of
§ 1983 claims, those brought by adult prisoners. Under § 1997e(b) the requirement of exhaustion is premised on the condition that state prisons develop adequate procedures for
processing grievances.
100 457 US 496 (1982).
101 Id at 513 n 15.
I02 In such cases, the federal court may choose to abstain from ruling if the § 1983 claim
is joined with a Fourteenth Amendment claim or a pendent state claim raising an unresolved issue of state law. This doctrine of abstention, known as Pullman abstention from
Railroad Comm'n v Pullman Co., 312 US 496, 498 (1941), allows the state to resolve questions of state law and the federal court to avoid reaching constitutional questions
unnecessarily.
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plaintiff may recover fees as long as she initially listed civil rights
violations in her judicial complaint. 03 Even courts that have denied fees have recognized this undesirable incentive, but have
downplayed its importance.1 04
In both Webb and Crest, the Court emphasized that "[a]n interpretation of § 1988 cannot be based on the assumption that 'an
attorney would advise the client to forgo an available avenue of
relief solely because § 1988 does not provide for attorney's
fees.' ,,10 The Court's reasoning ignores the purpose behind civil
right's fee shifting statutes: such statutes are designed to create
economic incentives for private enforcement of civil rights laws.
While an attorney may not advise a client to forgo an avenue of
relief, he or she may be reluctant to represent a client in administrative proceedings without any guarantee of receiving fees."' A
client who wishes to be represented may herself decide to forgo
proceedings out of fear of being saddled with an otherwise avoidable bill for attorney's fees. Allowing recovery of attorney's fees for
such proceedings would alleviate the problem of plaintiffs bringing
actions in federal court to preserve their right to fees when a state
administrative forum would be more appropriate for resolution of
their complaint.10 7 If fees are available in both forums, attorneys
and claimants will be able to choose the most appropriate forum
based on the complexity of the case and the factors noted by the
Court in Patsy without taking the availability of fees into
account. 08

1o 479 US at 12-13.
104 See Blow v Lascaris,523 F Supp 913, 917 (N D NY 1981), aff'd 668 F2d 670 (2d Cir

1982) (noting that the perverse incentives which result from denying fees to § 1983 plaintiffs
for administrative proceedings may be compounded by Thiboutot since many federal statutory rights are left to state administrative bodies to implement); Webb, 471 US at 241 n 15.
10' Crest, 479 US at 15 (quoting Webb, 471 US at 241 n 15).
106 The Supreme Court realized this possibility in Evans v Jeff D., 475 US 717 (1986)
(upholding terms of settlement that required plaintiff to waive statutory right to assert subsequent claim for attorney's fees) where it noted "the possibility that decisions by individual
clients to bargain away fee awards may, in the aggregate and in the long run, diminish
lawyers' expectations of statutory fees in civil rights cases." As a result, "the pool of lawyers
willing to represent plaintiffs in such cases might shrink." However, the Court believed that
"as a practical matter the likelihood of this circumstance arising is remote." Id at 741-742 n
34.
107 One of the important advantages of fair hearings is the speed with which claims are
heard. Of the 28,040 fair hearing claims resolved in New York in fiscal year 1985, all but 790
were resolved in under 90 days. Quarterly Public Assistance Statistics, Requests for Fair
Hearings in AFDC, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services 33 (Jan-March 1985)
("QuarterlyStatistics").
10' See text accompanying note 101. The Court's holding in Pennhurst State School &
Hosp. v Halderman, 465 US 89, 97-124 (1984), may also make it more advantageous for
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C. Improving the Quality of AFDC Administration
Not only will allowing fees increase claimants' incentives to
bring their claims in administrative proceedings, but liability for
fees may act as an important check on the quality of local administration of AFDC. A recent report of the New York State Bar Association's Task Force on Administrative Adjudication found that
"inadequacies at the local agency level are one of the major root
causes for the huge caseload. Instead of properly handling client/
benefit issues at the caseworker level, a vast amount of cases are
'bounced upstairs' to a fair hearing as a means of resolving the
problem."' 09 The Task Force also found that after a fair hearing
was requested, local agencies either withdrew their case action or
were reversed by the Commissioner in the vast number of cases. 110
It concluded that local agencies have no financial incentive to reduce the rate of error since no penalty is imposed for losing when a
decision is challenged. In the meantime, "[t]housands of poor people are compelled to appeal to a state agency for relief from a local
decision that the local agency knew or should have known was
11
wrong."
The Task Force recommended that the state establish minimum affirmance standards that the local agencies would have to
meet or else be subject to economic sanctions. Fee shifting can perform the same disciplinary function. The local government's
knowledge that it will have to pay attorney's fees, at least when §
1983 claims are involved," 2 may lead local officials to be more careful when denying or curtailing welfare funds.
One might argue that any money that the local government or
state must pay for attorney's fees will decrease the amount it devotes to welfare payments." 3 Such an argument is based on the
plaintiffs to advance claims in administrative proceedings. See note 42.
109 The New York State Bar Association, Report of the Task Force on Administrative
Adjudication 175, (July 14, 1988) ("Task Force Report").
110 New York City, for example, withdrew case actions or was reversed in 89 percent of
the cases for which hearings were requested. Id at 176.
.. Id at 177.
12 It is important to remember that many fair hearings will not involve § 1983 claims.
Of the cases that went to hearing in New York State, 61.8 percent involved the grant
amount and of these, 84 percent involved claims under the state's need standard, and 38.2
percent of the claims involved unspecified "eligibility factors other than grant amount."
Quarterly Statistics at 28, 32 (cited in note 107).
"I3A similar argument has been made by Jerry L. Mashaw against the procedural requirements mandated by the Court in Goldberg v Kelly, 397 US 254, 266-71 (1970). Mashaw
argues that the need for more funds to administer the system contemplated in Goldberg has
resulted in agencies finding other ways to cut costs that are potentially more detrimental to
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questionable assumption that fee shifting will not decrease the
state's error rate. For if that rate is in fact decreased, fewer termination decisions will be appealed, resulting in fewer fair hearings
in the first place. This may well result in more money being available for welfare, not less.
D. Attorney Participation in AFDC Proceedings
Though reducing the number of erroneous determinations is
laudable, one could argue that the current high rate of claimant
success " 4 despite low representation1"5 shows that claimants do
not need attorneys in order to prevail. Studies conducted under
the current system have in fact shown that the presence of counsel
does not significantly increase a claimants chances of success. "
But commentators have surmised that this may be a result of
claimants' use of attorneys who have "little or no experience in
handling welfare appeals.111 7 As one commentator noted in the

context of social security disability claims, performance of counsel
"occurs in the context of the incentive structure created by the existing system."'1 8 Attorneys' success rate might increase if attorneys were assured of fees, and, in time, a specialized bar for welfare claims might develop. " 9 Moreover, an active welfare bar
would encourage appeals by recipients with legitimate claims who,
plaintiffs. Jerry L. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State 33-34 (Yale, 1985).
'" In 1985, claimants in New York State were successful in approximately 85 percent
of the fair hearings held, prevailing in 22,784 out of 28,040 hearings. QuarterlyStatistics at
31 (cited in note 107).
115 Only 974 of the 28,040 claimants who participated in New York State fair hearings
in 1985 were represented by counsel. Id at 34.
11 Special Student Project, ProceduralDue Process and the Welfare Recipient: A Statistical Study of AFDC FairHearings in Wisconsin, 1978 Wisc L Rev 145, 206, and Cooper,
Goldberg's ForgottenFootnote, 64 Minn L Rev at 1170 (cited in note 24).
11 Id at 1170 n 244.
18 Jerry L. Mashaw, et al, Social Security Hearings and Appeals: A Study of the Social Security Administration Hearing System 92 (Lexington, 1978). In the context of SSI
hearings, Mashaw also noted: "The attorney's failure to devote time to the case, and a consequent unfamiliarity with the governing law or the facts concerning the claimant's condition, are repeatedly cited as characteristic of much legal representation." Id at 92.
"' If local officials improve their advocacy in fair hearings (a course urged by the Task
Force Report), the claimant's need for an attorney may increase. The Task Force noted that
at present "[m]ost of the applicants/recipients appear pro se and often are the persons least
able to competently represent themselves, with many not having the ability to speak or
write English, let alone the ability to comprehend the often technical requirements of the
law governing their entitlement to public assistance." Task Force Report at 170-71 (cited in
note 109). Such claimants, when faced with vigorous advocacy by local officials, may be in
great need of an attorney.
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without an attorney, might not even be aware of their rights.1 2
On a practical level, one could argue that using attorneys will
make the procedure more adversarial and time-consuming. Procedures designed to be short and non-combative will become full
blown trials. The Supreme Court rejected this argument in
Goldberg v Kelly, where the Court noted that using attorneys
would not necessarily encumber the hearing. 121 More recently,
however, in Walters v Nat. Assn. of Radiation Survivors, the
Court stressed the extent to which the presence of counsel may
complicate otherwise simple procedures. 2 2 In Radiation Survivors,
the Court based its holding, in part, on a finding that Congress
intended that the system of awarding veteran's benefits remain as
'
informal and non-adversarial as possible. 23
In the case of AFDC, however, HHS as well as the state of
New York clearly contemplated the use of attorneys in fair hearings. The federal regulations and the state statute require that
claimants be informed that they may be represented by counsel,124
and the state is responsible for travel expenses of claimant's counsel.1 25 In addition, the state statute requires that claimants be told
of the availability of community legal services.' 26 Failure to provide
this information to claimants constitutes grounds for annulling a
hearing.'2 7 Given these requirements, the concerns that the Court
expressed in Radiation Survivors have little bearing on the use of
attorneys in AFDC hearings.
'20That

current claimants might be a self-selected group whose claims are obviously

meritorious even to non-lawyers, might account for the very high success rate in fair hearings under the present system. See note 114.
121 397 US 254, 270-271 (1970) (state termination of AFDC payments without prior evidentiary hearing violates Due Process Clause): "We do not say that counsel must be provided at the pre-termination hearing, but only that the recipient must be allowed to retain
an attorney if he so desires. Counsel can help delineate the issues, present the factual contentions in an orderly manner, conduct cross-examination, and generally safeguard the interests of the recipient. We do not anticipate that this assistance will unduly prolong or
otherwise encumber the hearing."
122 473 US 305, 324-326 (1985) (upholding constitutionality of $10 limitation on fee that
may be paid an attorney or agent who represents a veteran seeking benefits for death or
disability).
123 Id at 323.
124 45 CFR § 205.10(a)(3)(iii) (1987); NY Social Services Law, § 22(12)(c) (McKinney
1983).
,2 Monroe Cty. Legal Assist. Corp. v Lavine, 82 Misc 2d 343, 368 NYS2d 1008 (Sup Ct
1975).
126
12,

NY Social Services Law, § 22(12)(d) (McKinney 1983).
Breitfeller v D'Elia, 99 App Div 2d 756, 471 NYS2d 663 (1984).
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IV. A

CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S REASONING IN

Crest

The preceding section has argued that attorney's fees should
be awarded for successful § 1983 claims in AFDC proceedings,
both as a means of encouraging greater use of the proceedings and
as a means of curtailing erroneous decisions by local officials. In
other words, despite the fact that the proceedings are optional, the
Court should analogize them to Title VII proceedings and not to
the proceedings at issue in Webb. But Webb is not the only decision that stands in the way of fee awards. Under the Court's decision in Crest, a claimant who prevails in administrative proceedings and is not required to bring a court action on the merits is
barred from bringing a separate action for fees under § 1988.
A.

The Relationship Between Crest and Carey

The decision in Crest seems to run directly counter to the decision in New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v Carey,.where the Supreme Court upheld an award of fees under Title VII upon finding
that Title VII supports "a suit solely to obtain an award of attorney's fees for legal work done in state and local proceedings."128 A
federal action solely for fees, albeit in the context of § 1988, is precisely what confronted the Court in Crest. The Crest Court
avoided overruling Carey by treating its case as one of first impression and reading Carey as having reached the issue of an independent action for fees only in dicta. 2 "
This characterization of Carey is not convincing. First, both
the majority and dissent at the appellate level in Carey understood
the case as involving a separate action solely for fees. 30 Justice
Blackmun, writing for five justices in Carey, also understood the
facts of the case to require the Court to reach the question that the
Crest Court characterizes as dicta.'3 " Second, two years after Ca447 US at 66.
479 US at 13-14. The Crest court points to Justice Stevens' concurrence in Carey
where he writes that "[w]hether Congress intended to authorize a separate federal action
solely to recover costs, including attorney's fees, incurred in obtaining administrative relief
in either a deferral or a nondeferral State is not only doubtful but is a question that is
plainly not presented by this record." 447 US at 71. In Carey, Stevens pointed out that
respondent's initial complaint in federal court did include substantive civil rights claims.
For the purposes of characterizing the attorney's fee claim in Carey, Stevens found it irrelevant that all substantive claims were dismissed by agreement between the parties before any
action was taken on them by the federal court. Id at 71-72.
"I0Carey v New York Gaslight Club, Inc., 598 F2d 1253, 1255-56 (2d Cir 1979).
231 Blackmun's understanding is not difficult to defend. In Carey, the federal court action was filed with the understanding that its substantive claims would only be pursued if
128

129
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rey, the Supreme Court itself cited the case for the proposition
that Title VII will "support a federal suit 'solely to obtain an
award of attorney's fees for legal work done in state and local proceedings.' ,1s2 Third, the legislative history surrounding the 1986
passage of the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986
("HCPA"), as which provides attorneys fees for plaintiffs who prevail in actions brought under the Education of the Handicapped
Act, ("EHA"), 3 4 demonstrates both that Congress understood Carey to reach the question of fee awards for administrative proceedings, and that Congress approved of the Carey holding. 1 5 Courts
that have ruled on the availability of attorney's fees in a separate
suit under the HCPA have found that the Crest ruling does not
operate to disallow fee recovery, since Congress clearly intended
Carey to control the outcome. 38 Finally, in Jones v American
State Bank,3 7 the Eighth Circuit recently allowed a Title VII
plaintiff to bring a separate action for fees, finding that even after
Crest, Carey continues to control such actions in Title VII cases
and allows for separate action.
In the context of Title VII, the Court recognized in Carey that
if plaintiffs are required to participate in administrative proceedings it would be unfair to deny them fees for such proceedings. It

the plaintiff did not prevail at the administrative level. Since Carey had already prevailed at
the administrative level and had no reason to request relief on the substantive counts, the
only issue before the district court was the award of attorney's fees for prior success at the
administrative level. What distinguished Carey as a case of "first impression," id at 1255,
was that federal court litigation was not necessary to vindicate the respondent's Title VII
rights since she had already prevailed through administrative channels.
132 White v New Hampshire Dept. of Empl. Sec., 455 US 445, 452 n 13 (1982).
,13
Pub L No 99-372, 100 Stat 796, codified at 20 USCA § 1415 (Supp 1988).
"1 20 USC § 1400 et seq (1982).
135The HCPA was passed after the Court's decisions in Carey and Webb, but before
the Crest decision. In the HCPA, Congress specified that the fee shifting provision included
the award of fees to plaintiffs who prevail in administrative proceedings. 20 USCA §
1415(e)(4)(D)(i) and (iii) (Supp 1988). The Congressional debates surrounding passage of
the Act and the Report of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, S Rep No
112, 99th Cong, 2d Sess, reprinted in 1986 USCCAN 1798, suggest that Congress relied on
Carey as providing the precedent for such an award. See, for example, 131 Cong Rec No
104, S10400 (July 30, 1985) (Sen. Simon on Carey); 131 Cong Rec No 155, H9969-9970 (Nov
12, 1985) (Rep. Williams, Rep. Biaggi). But see 131 Cong Rec No 155, H9966-9967 (Nov 12,
1985) (Rep. Bartlett); 132 Cong Rec No 97, H4842 (Rep. Bartlett); and id at H4844 (Rep.
Jeffords) (July 24, 1986).
116Three courts specifically mention Crest: Prescott o Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified
Sch., 659 F Supp 921, 924 n 3 (D C Cal 1987); Burpee v Manchester School Dist., 661 F
Supp 731, 733 (D NH 1987); and Michael F. v Cambridge School Department, No 86-2532C, 1987 WL 7752 (D Mass March 5, 1987). But see Rollison v Biggs, 660 F Supp 875, 877 (D
Del 1987).
'17 No 87-5480, 1988 USAPP LEXIS 12893 (8th Cir Sept 21, 1988).
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also recognized that it would be anomalous to deny fees to plaintiffs who prevail in such proceedings, but to award them to plaintiffs who are unsuccessful before state fair employment practice
agencies but ultimately vindicate their rights in federal court. For
these reasons, it allowed a separate action for fees.
In Crest, however, the Court barred plaintiffs with fee claims
under § 1988 from bringing a separate action for fees even if the
administrative proceeding in which they prevailed clearly concerned a § 1983 claim. The Court once again distinguished, as it
had in Webb, proceedings that are mandatory under Title VII
from those that are optional under § 1988. It suggested that in the
absence of an exhaustion requirement, it is unclear what types of
administrative proceedings actually enforce the various statutes
listed in § 1988. In order to identify when a claim is truly a civil
rights action, one needs a bright line rule. The Court decided that
the filing of a complaint on the merits affords such a bright line.
B. The Language and Purpose of § 1988
The Court's decision in Crest to use the filing of a judicial
complaint to differentiate between plaintiffs who may recover fees
for administrative proceedings under § 1988 and those who may
not, does not follow from the language of the statute138 or from its
legislative history. The Supreme Court has cited the terminology
of the House Report accompanying § 1988 to support the proposition that Congress "clearly contemplated that parties obtaining
fees would have initiated civil rights litigation."'" 9 It noted in Crest
that the House Report refers to "the litigation," "out-of-court settlement," and the filing of the "complaint.' 140 This language may
justify the conclusion that Congress thought most fee recoveries
would follow court actions, but it does not demonstrate that fee
recovery for administrative proceedings falls outside the scope §

1988.
The Court also concluded that "an award of attorney's fees
under § 1988 depends not only on the results obtained, but also on
what actions were needed to achieve those results."' 4 ' However,
the legislative history, as it emerges from the committee reports,
shows that Congress was much more concerned with the outcome
"'The

language of § 1988 is the same as Title VII which, the Court has found, does

support an award of fees in an independent action. See section II.A.
,3,Crest, 479 US at 13.
140 Id at 12-13; See also, Webb, 471 US at 241 n 16.
4
479 US at 12-13.
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of the actions (that they result in the vindication of rights protected by civil rights statutes) than with the type of procedure
used to effect this outcome. In an effort to make sure that attorney's fees would not be limited to suits that are fully adjudicated
on the merits, the House Report states that an order need not be
final, only that it must "determin[e] substantial rights of the par14 2
ties" to make award of attorney's fees appropriate.
To illustrate this point, the House Report notes that a settlement or a consent decree between the parties not only provides an
acceptable basis for a fee award but that such resolutions should
be encouraged as they help lessen docket congestion. 4 ' In addition, as noted in section I of this comment, the committee also intended that fees be available to parties who prevail on pendent
state claims when there are statutory fee claims or constitutional
fee claims that are not reached but that arose out of a "common
nucleus of operative fact" with the fee claim. 144 Finally, claims that
are moot because the defendant has voluntarily ceased the unlaw1 45
ful practice may also merit an award of fees.
The various situations mentioned in the House Report have
provided the basis for fee awards in cases following passage of §
1988. Plaintiffs have been awarded attorney's fees when the suit is
resolved by settlement or a consent decree, 4 6 when a plaintiff
prevails on pendent non-fee claims, 147 or when a plaintiff's suit has
been rendered moot because of some voluntary act of the
14
defendant. 1

142

House Report at 8, reprinted in Source Book at 216 (cited in note 37).

143 Id at 7, reprinted in Source Book at 215 (cited in note 37).

Id at 4 n 7, reprinted in Source Book at 212 (cited in note 37).
"Similarly, after a complaint is filed, a defendant might voluntarily cease the unlawful practice. A court should still award fees even though it might conclude, as a matter of
equity, that no formal relief, such as an injunction, is needed." Id at 7, reprinted in Source
Book at 215. See also, Comment, Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards in Moot Cases, 49 U
Chi L Rev 819 (1982).
146 Maher v Gagne, 448 US 122, 129 (1980) (§ 1983 challenge to state's AFDC regulations): "The fact that respondent prevailed through a settlement rather than through litigation does not weaken her claim to fees. Nothing in the language of § 1988 conditions the
District Court's power to award fees on full litigation of the issues or on a judicial determination that the plaintiff's rights have been violated."
14 Carrerasv City of Anaheim, 768 F2d 1039, 1050 (9th Cir 1985) (when the plaintiff
in a civil rights action prevails on a pendent state claim based on the same nucleus of operative fact as a substantial federal claim, fees may be awarded under § 1988).
148 Martin v Heckler, 773 F2d 1145, 1149 (11th Cir 1985) (en banc), citing Robinson v
Kimbrough, 652 F2d 458, 465 (5th Cir 1981) (plaintiffs will be awarded fees even though
claim mooted if " 'plaintiffs' lawsuit was a catalyst motivating defendants to provide the
primary relief sought in a manner desired by litigation' "). See also, Williams v Miller, 620
F2d 199 (8th Cir 1980).
144

146
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As the Court points out in Crest, the cases that the House
Report cites in support of the above propositions included at least
the filing of a judicial complaint.1 4 However, a case in which the
plaintiff has obtained final relief without a judgment seems no
closer to a "true" court action than one in which she obtained relief through administrative proceedings undertaken pursuant to
federal statute. The determination of a plaintiff's rights by an administrative agency after a full evidentiary hearing may provide a
better record on which to base attorney's fees than a case resolved
through settlement.
C.

The Anomaly Arising from Crest

Webb clearly allowed fees for at least some work in optional
administrative proceedings that culminate in court actions. Therefore, the Crest ruling gives rise to a weaker form of the anomaly
already anticipated in dicta of Parker v Califano, one of the earliest Title VII cases: A plaintiff "who is unsuccessful in the administrative proceedings but succeeds in court will be able to recoup attorneys' fees for all legal services rendered, while a plaintiff who is
successful at the administrative level will not be able to recoup any
attorneys' fees." 150 In Parker, it was the defendant who pointed
out this anomaly in arguing against the award of fees even for administrative proceedings that do culminate in court actions. The
court, however, while stressing that the question was not before it,
suggested that one way to solve this problem would be "to allow
the plaintiff to come to court on the single issue of whether, and in
what amount, attorneys' fees are to be awarded."' 15 This is precisely the solution that the Court rejected in Crest.
In other early cases, courts dismissed similar arguments made
by defendants opposing fee requests either by pointing to Parker's
suggested solution to the anomaly 52 or by deciding that an agency
itself could be given the authority to award fees.15 3 Still other
courts have noted the anomaly that results from denying fees for
successful administrative proceedings, but have denied fees anyway.' 54 In Carey, the Supreme Court's decision to award fees was
1' 479 US at 13.

Parker v Califano, 561 F2d 320, 330 n 24 (DC Cir 1977).
1 Id.
"50

"' Foster v Boorstin, 561 F2d 340, 343 n 8 (DC Cir 1977); Fischer v Adams, 572 F2d
406, 410 (1st Cir 1978).
M'Smith v Califano, 446 F Supp 530, 532 n 3 (D DC 1978).
' Derheim v Hennepin Cty. Bur. of Soc. Serv., Etc., 524 F Supp 1321, 1324 n 2 (D
Minn 1981) (arguing that anomaly will be less of a danger in a § 1983 suit than in a Title
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based in part on a recognition of the anomaly that would result
from a denial of fees. The court of appeals in Crest followed this
reasoning,155 but the Supreme Court dealt with the problem simply
by stating that ". . if one must ignore the plain language of a
statute to avoid a possible anomalous result '[t]he short answer is
that Congress did not write the statute that way.' ",156
D.

The Crest Court's Concerns and AFDC Fair Hearings.

In Crest, the Court held that a plaintiff may not request fees
unless she has filed a complaint on the merits of her case as well.
The Court's decision to adopt this rule points to a policy concern
that may have been driving the opinion itself: the concern that allowing separate actions for fees will open up too many out-of-court
activities to fee requests. 157 The Court assumes that since optional
administrative proceedings may be much more informal than court
actions, it will be impossible to judge which proceedings deserve
attorney's fees. Once "proceedings" is read too broadly, all sorts of
informal negotiations may give rise to fee requests. To show the
absurdity of allowing fees for out-of-court proceedings, the majority conjures up a world in which attorney's fees must be awarded
when an employee, after talking to his lawyer, informally discusses
hiring or promotion practices with an employer, who in response
alters those practices to comply more fully with employment discrimination laws. 158
The majority's concerns are not entirely convincing when
viewed in the context of the Title VI negotiations in Crest, but
they become even less persuasive when the proceedings at issue are
the much more formal fair hearings under the Social Security Act.
In the context of such proceedings, the "legitimacy" rational for
requiring a complaint on the merits does not apply. The plaintiff
has already been required to undertake quasi-judicial action to
vindicate her rights. The filing of a complaint on the merits cannot
increase the legitimacy of the plaintiff's actions. There is no need
for a bright line rule that separates "true" actions from informal
VII action since it is more likely that the content of § 1983 administrative proceedings will
diverge from the content of § 1983 suit. Therefore, "[a] plaintiff with a strong case before an
administrative body may have a very weak section 1983 claim."); Blow, 523 F Supp at 917
(noting anomaly but finding its remedy more properly the task of the federal legislature).
151Crest Street Community Council, Inc. v N.C. Dept. of Transp., 769 F2d 1025, 1033
(4th Cir 1985).
"1 479 US at 14 (quoting Garcia v United States, 469 US 70, 79 (1984)).
157479 US at 14.
158Id.
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discussions.
E. A Congressional Solution

Given the categorical nature of the decision in Crest that §
1988 does not allow a separate action solely for fees, it is unlikely
that the Court will make an exception and allow plaintiffs who prevail on § 1983 claims in fair hearings to bring separate actions for
fees. In the past, Congress has traditionally taken the lead in responding to the Court's decisions concerning attorney's fees. The
1976 Attorney's Fees Awards Act was passed in response to the
Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Co. v Wilderness Society,' 9
holding that, absent statutory authorization, attorney's fees may
not be awarded in civil rights actions. The attorney's fee provision
accompanying the Education of the Handicapped Act was passed
in response to the Court's decision in Smith v Robinson160 denying
plaintiff's who prevailed under that Act from receiving attorney's
fees under § 1988 or under the fee shifting provisions of the Rehabilitation Act. 6 One court has already appealed to Congress to clarify the law
governing attorney's fees for administrative proceedings to enforce
§ 1983. In Blow v Lascaris,62 a case involving a fair hearing under
AFDC, the district court agreed that the plaintiff had in fact prevailed in an administrative proceeding to enforce a federal statutory right protected by § 1983. Therefore, it only examined the
question of whether § 1988 allowed an independent action for
fees. 6' The court concluded that such an action was procedurally
barred, but expressed misgivings about the possibly unfair results
of its decision. It appealed to Congress to remedy the problem:
Since many federal statutory rights, such as the one involved
in the present case, are left to state administrative bodies to
implement, it seems probable that the frequency of cases with
factual patterns similar or identical to the present case will
increase. While this Court's construction of § 1988 embodied
159421 US 240 (1975).
160 468 US 992 (1984). See note 52.
'61 29 USC § 794a (1982).
102 523 F Supp 913 (N D NY 1981), aff'd 668 F2d 670 (2d Cir 1982).
'1' One article written before the Court's decisions in Webb and Crest used this case to
argue that fees should be awarded to plaintiffs who prevail in administrative proceedings.
Though Justice Brennan cited to the article in his dissent in Crest, the author's plea was not
effective. See Jeffrey A. Parness and Gigi A. Woodruff, Federal District Court Proceedings
to Recover Attorney's Fees for PrevailingPartieson Section 1983 Claims in State Administrative Agencies, 18 Ga L Rev 83 (1983).
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in this decision may well be burdensome and onerous to both
litigants and the federal courts... [t]he task of clarifying the
proper scope of [§ 1988] .

.

. is more properly left to the fed-

legislature." 16

eral
Congress has not yet responded to the court's appeal.
In order to overturn the application of Crest to fair hearings,
Congress should amend the Social Security Act 165 to provide that
fees shall be available under § 1988 for claimants who prevail in
administrative fair hearings on claims that state a cause of action
under § 1983. Such an amendment would be consistent with the
language of § 1988 and would encourage claimants to use these
hearings instead of filing suit in federal court.
V.

CONCLUSION

Allowing recovery of attorney's fees for successful actions
brought under § 1983 encourages private citizens to take an active
role in enforcing their federally guaranteed rights. Court actions
provide only one means of enforcing such rights. In addition, administrative enforcement mechanisms such as fair hearings allow
individuals to present § 1983 claims in a quasi-judicial setting
before state agencies.
Individuals who wish to contest a denial of welfare benefits in
fair hearings are told that they have the right to be represented by
an attorney. However, under current law they cannot recover attorney's fees under § 1988 if they prevail on § 1983 claims raised in
such hearings, though identical claims would provide the basis for
a fee award in state or federal court. As a result, individuals with §
1983 claims have an incentive to bypass administrative remedies
and file court actions in order to preserve their right to attorney's
fees under § 1988.
523 F Supp at 917.
If Congress amended the Social Security Act, fees would also be available for fair
hearings conducted under the Medicaid program, 42 USC § 1396 et seq, the administrative
procedures of which are essentially the same as those governing the AFDC program. See 42
CFR § 431.201 et seq (1987). A separate amendment would be needed to provide fees for
plaintiffs who prevail in hearings held under the Food Stamp Act of 1977, 7 USC § 2011 et
seq (1982), the procedures of which are set forth in 7 CFR §§ 273.15, 277.16 (1987).
It is likely that a small but significant percentage of fair hearings under these statutes
will also involve issues of federal law and give rise to § 1983 claims. In an article in August
of 1988, the New York Times reported that of the fair hearings held to contest decisions
made by New York City (including food stamps, Medicaid, and state welfare appeals), 6.7
percent of the cases the city lost involved situations in which a law, regulation, or policy was
misapplied. Josh Barbanel, Welfare in New York: Judging System's Errors, NY Times at
11 (Aug 29, 1988).
16

165
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This comment has argued that in a limited class of hearings,
which can be characterized as "proceedings to enforce § 1983," fees
should be awarded to prevailing parties-whether those parties
prevail only after judicial action or in the administrative hearings
themselves. Congress should amend the Social Security Act, specifically rejecting application of the Supreme Court's decisions in
Webb and Crest to fair hearings conducted pursuant to that Act.
By allowing fees under § 1988 for fair hearings, Congress will encourage the use of administrative remedies and distribute welfarebased § 1983 actions more evenly between agencies and the courts.

